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10 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, DDM&S
SUBJECT : Comments on Perspectives for Intelligence -
 1975-1980

1. A "perspective" can be "a distant view" or "a proper evaluation with proportional importance given to the component parts." This paper offers something in between these two definitions; something that meets the basic planning needs of the Intelligence Community, and something beyond which it would be hazardous and imprudent to attempt predictions. Nonetheless, it remains a paper which is open to much in the way of competitive interpretation, a factor of particular significance to the Management and Services Directorate. The DDM&S can anticipate some of the competitive views and participate in some of the managerial decisions which resolve the differences between them, but the DDM&S--by definition--cannot be a primary protagonist in the substantive interpretation of these perspectives.

2. The DDM&S is not barred, however, from offering substantive comment. One problem area that is conspicuous by its absence from the statement of major world problems in Part I is the possibly changing position of the United States in the world scene resulting from either our own domestic problems and the seeds therein of neo-isolationism, or from foreign perceptions of U. S. isolationism. No matter how confident many of us feel over the ultimate strengthening of our constitutional fabric as a result of the Watergate experience, the opposite view could well influence the decisions of foreign friends and foes alike.

3. The key phrasing of Part II would seem to be the "extraordinary efforts" required against the Soviet target. Given the continuing requirements on the Intelligence Community as a whole to provide rapid and accurate data and assessments on a wide variety of foreseeable and "baffling new situations," it will fall largely to the CIA to make the "extraordinary

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efforts" against the Soviet target. The decisions involved in such will have direct impact on the role of the DDM&S in the allocation of resources and the provision of services. Implicit in this area of decision is the whole question of where and how we deploy our capabilities worldwide, including the numbers, types, and training of personnel, and the tools needed to do the job. The paper elsewhere (p. 18, para. B.9.) foresees many requirements for tradeoffs in reaching optimum relationships among programs and among resources. However, until some of these decisions are made on the mix of overt and covert efforts, and the mix of human and technical means, the DDM&S can only anticipate commitments arising out of these decisions through close monitoring and active participation in the decision-making process.

4. While Part II is necessarily quite broad and general, Part III offers more basis for DDM&S reaction. The application of technology to the intelligence profession is probably the single most dominant thread running through the stated needs for study and planning. While we would suggest that the word "plateau" in paragraph 2 on page 16 would better read "point," "height," or "extent," the problem of paragraphs 1-4 on exploiting the extensive product is real and probably calls for technological means of solution. Paragraphs 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15 and 16 all treat technology, either directly or indirectly. Paragraph 11c sets forth the need to base investment in technology on substantive intelligence needs rather than technological improvement momentum. The DDM&S clearly could play a critical role in this regard by insuring that we keep abreast of technological trends and developments which should be considered for application to intelligence work. While the DDS&T would play a primary role in this regard, particularly as regards collection, the DDM&S should play a stronger role in the areas of information processing and transmission, as well as the managerial areas of decision on compatibility and standardization, and allocation of resources generally. The Information Systems Analysis Staff, the Office of Joint Computer Support, and the Office of Communications represent vital capabilities in this regard.

5. Section E on Manpower Implications in effect describes a new type of intelligence professional for the future. The recruitment, training, and career development requirements attending this new breed will impact heavily on both the Office of Personnel and the Office of Training. The concept

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involved needs articulation both within the Intelligence Community and for the American public--particularly the academic sector. The intelligence profession has some major roots in academia; both the profession and the academic world suffer from the separation which has characterized recent years. Whether to be included in this paper or not, a policy of detente would be in order for the profession in its relations with the academic community.

6. One facet of the new intelligence professional is overlooked in this paper. Although reference is made in paragraph 17 to the need for protection of sources and methods while being responsive to the American public's right to information, the guidance is institutional rather than personal for the intelligence professional. The cocoon of intelligence work remains comfortingly intact. However, the trend of legislative deliberation in this area makes it rather clear that the intelligence professional in the future will not be able to presume the type of security protection which many still take for granted. It may well be that our professionals need to be reoriented toward an assumption that much of what they write could be in the public domain after the passage of but a few short years. The dangers to our effort that might arise out of such reorientation may not be as great as the dangers foreseeable if we fail to consider the public interest in what we are doing, the ways in which we go about it, and the cost benefits of an intelligence organization in an open society.

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